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Abstract : Focusing events are sudden, striking large-scale occurrences that
attract political attention. However, not all potential focusing events appear on the
agenda. Combining data from multiple sources, this study conducts an analysis of
the determinants of prioritisation of external focusing events in the European
Council over a period longer than two decades. The results demonstrate that
decisions regarding the placement of crises on the agenda are underscored by
exogenous (humanitarian) and endogenous (geopolitical interest) considerations.
Those events with a higher likelihood of agenda access include manmade incidents
(versus natural disasters), events with larger death tolls and crises in the
neighbourhood. Stronger competition between potential focusing events across
time and space reduces the chances of access. The level of attention each event
receives depends on purely strategic interests. Focusing events in neighbouring
countries gain a higher portion of attention, as do occurrences in states having a
larger trade exchange with the European Union.
Key words: agenda setting, European Council, European Union, focusing
events, foreign affairs
Introduction
Focusing events are sudden, striking large-scale occurrences that attract the
attention of various political and societal actors, often on a global scale.
Political leaders regularly respond to such events within and outside the
territory of their polity, ﬁrst and foremost by commenting on the event. This
can come in the form of condolences, expressions of sympathy for victims
and suffering populations, the condemnation of inhumane acts or an
announcement of a particular position towards perpetrators. This initial
reaction can later transform into more substantial policy responses, such as
the provision of humanitarian aid, involvement in a military coalition or
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even a rethinking of domestic policies. In the European Union (EU), the top
institution that can transmit the single voice of the Union to the rest of the
world is the European Council. During its regular meetings, which over
the years have grown in number, the Heads of State and Government have
addressed a multiplicity of issues, and the agenda in many cases had to be
readjusted to reﬂect external focusing events. Prominent cases include
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US), the outbreak of the
Russia–Georgia war in August 2008 and the ﬂoods in Pakistan in the
summer of 2010.
Although there is some evidence on the conditions under which focusing
events inﬂuence policy, their relationship with political attention is often
taken for granted. However, not all potential focusing events are equally
likely to reach the agenda. Even those that are eventually discussed differ in
the level of attention they receive. For example, the European Council came
up with a declaration on the devastating Iranian earthquake of June 1990,
but did not mention even a word about the recent disaster of the same type
in Haiti in January 2010. Although the cost of both events was estimated to
be relatively similar, the number of causalities and people affected was more
than ﬁve times bigger in the second case.1 Another example can be traced to
two terrorist attacks with a comparatively similar number of injured and
killed hostages in Russia during the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. The Beslan
school siege (September 2004) was not mentioned in any way in the ofﬁcial
account of European Council meetings, whereas the Moscow theatre
hostage crisis (October 2002) provoked a declaration full of shock and
condemnation.
The reasoning behind making the political decision to discuss a disaster,
accident or violent attack occurring abroad is largely unexplored. This
article aims to shed light on this area of research by theorising on the
conditions under which responsiveness can occur and how more attention
can be allocated to an event. The study uses a number of existing datasets
and combines data on different kinds of potential focusing events with data
on political attention in the European Council. The analysis covers the
period 1975–2012, but with data on some of the independent variables
beginning only as early as 1988/1989. The article proceeds by explaining
what a potential focusing event is and how it relates to attention in
political institutions. This is followed by a discussion of the political venue
of interest – the European Council. Subsequently, a theory section lays the
basis for understanding the logic behind giving attention to focusing events
and presents the hypotheses. After a description of the data and the
1 According to the International Emergency Disaster Database, available at http://www.
emdat.be/database.
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approach, the analysis is described. The article concludes with a discussion
of the ﬁndings.
Focusing events and agenda setting
Focusing events occupy a unique place in political agenda setting, as they
can disturb the priorities of the day. Their power is often derived from a
background of deterioration on a speciﬁc issue to which they add urgency
by acting as a trigger for attention (Kingdon 2011). This leads to what
Downs (1972) conceptualised as an “alarmed discovery”. A focusing event
can serve to underline the size of a given problem, unlock mismanagement
in prevention mechanisms or be a signal for potential future failures. It can
present the necessary conditions for redeﬁning an issue, which would then
allow it to appear on the top political agenda (Princen 2011).
Calling something a focusing event means that the occurrence has
already attracted attention. In order to examine what characteristics of the
event and its context trigger a sense of urgency in attention, one should ﬁrst
deﬁne a potential focusing event. In his seminal work, Birkland proposed
the following deﬁnition: “an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be
reasonably deﬁned as harmful or revealing the possibility of potential future
harms, inﬂicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or could be
concentrated on a deﬁnable geographical area or community of interest,
and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simulta-
neously” (1997, 22). In short, the crucial traits of potential focusing events
are suddenness, rarity, overall unexpectedness and some sort of effective or
implied harm. The classical types of occurrences that fall within the
boundaries of this deﬁnition are natural disasters and industrial
accidents. The scope can be broadened to what Birkland calls “deliberately
caused catastrophes” (2006), such as terrorist attacks or other kinds of
large-scale intentional harms like those taking place in violent conﬂicts.
Potential focusing effects are prone to attracting attention from
the public, politicians and policymakers due to the mechanism of
disproportionate information processing, which is a guiding factor both
for humans and organisations (Jones 2001). We tend to stick to the status
quo in decision-making processes, because a step aside involves the addi-
tional investment of time and possibly other resources. This creates a
situation where we react to incoming information signals as little as
possible, which in practice means underreacting. However, although
negative indicators build up and organisations ignore most of the signals
delivering such information, a striking piece of information in the form of a
focusing event can shake the stability of the status quo. In turn, this will
result in overreaction aimed to compensate for the missed opportunities
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(Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The described mechanism presents a
long-term perspective of the policy agenda as a sum of many small
incremental changes and a bunch of very large punctuations in attention.
However, information signals do not only come from the domestic arena.
In an interdependent world where policymaking across all sectors has
an international dimension, external focusing events are not weaker
competitors for attention. Polities that wish to call themselves global
powers in particular need to be alert to crises2 happening beyond their
territories. Although focusing events are rare occurrences, their number is
not negligible on an international scale. For example, in recent years, an
average of 16 earthquakes of major and great magnitude (over 7 on the
Richter scale) and 145 of strong magnitude (between 6 and 6.9 on the
Richter scale) took place annually worldwide.3 Meanwhile, the number of
terrorist acts in which at least one human being was injured or killed has
averaged over 1,700 per year.4 These two examples illustrate an abundance
of information when it comes to unexpected events that require swift
reaction. It seems necessary for political actors to have predeﬁned selection
mechanisms and dedicate attention only to those crises that meet certain
criteria. Thus, although a potential focusing event can act as a key for
unlocking a “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 2011), for a punctuation
in attention to materialise, huge constraints need to be overcome. I argue
that, for external potential focusing events, these constraints could relate to
endogenous and exogenous aspects of the political arena in which events
are to be deliberated, as well as to structural capacity conditions.
Scholars of public policy have shown great interest in explaining the
inﬂuence of focusing events on policy – in particular, the reasons why one
crisis results in policy change and others do not (e.g. Nohrstedt 2008;
Walgrave and Varone 2008). However, the consequences of potential
focusing events for attention, which forms a stage before policy change, are
sometimes taken for granted. Further, research in this area is scarce.
Scholars have focused on single events, such as the Three Mile Island inci-
dent (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) or the 9/11 attacks (Birkland 2004),
demonstrating how these cases have acted as reinforcing mechanisms for
2 Some authors advocate a distinction between crises and focusing events (Nohrstedt andWeible
2010), but the dividing line is not entirely clear, and the two are sometimes considered nested
categories (Birkland and Nath 2000; Faulkner 2001) or simply referred to interchangeably
(Boin et al. 2005). For the purposes of this article, the two concepts are used as synonyms.
3 According to data for the period 2000–2012 from the Earthquake Hazards Programme of
the US Geological Survey, available at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/year/
eqstats.php.
4 According to data from the RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents for the
period 2000–2009, available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html.
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attention being given to the domains with which they are associated and
beyond. Studies on speciﬁc issue areas have found longitudinal effects of
focusing events on these areas (see e.g. Liu et al. 2011 on global climate
change). However, overall analyses of the extent to which such events
inﬂuence institutional agendas are extremely rare. A recent study by
van Assche (2012) on the Belgian executive agenda found that some 40%of
the large punctuations in attention are related to focusing events (whereas
elections and leadership change seem not to matter). However, the study
stops there without digging deeper into the reasons behind the question of
why some events made it to the agenda and contributed to the signiﬁcant
increases in attention. The research here aims to take a step in this direction
both theoretically and empirically by analysing the latent agenda-setting
power of external focusing events in the EU context.
The European Council as a venue for external focusing events
The European Council originated as an informal body in the mid-1970s
because of the necessity to better coordinate common actions and reach
agreements on highly conﬂictual issues that proved difﬁcult for the Council
of Ministers (Werts 1992). This essential role for the body did not only
pertain to Community action but also to the European Political
Co-operation – the predecessor to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy. Establishing regular meetings allowed the European Council to
address events happening all over the world and to set the EU agenda for
positions and further actions (Werts 2008; de Schoutheete 2012). Although
speciﬁc policy decisions on foreign affairs matters have been made by the
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC),5 those of highest proﬁle have been reached
at the European Council level (Peterson et al. 2012). In fact, the European
Council authorises all important decisions within the EU foreign
affairs framework. Not surprisingly, it has, therefore, become “the
most visible personiﬁcation of the international identity of the Union”
(Soetendorp 1999, 71).
The fact that important current events constitute a key element on the
European Council agenda is largely recognised (see e.g. Bulmer andWessels
1987; Wessels 2008; Princen 2012). External focusing events can also gain
access to the EU agenda via the FAC. However, in order to be addressed by
the European Council, they need to pass a higher threshold or, in other
words, gain priority status. One reason for this is the high political
authority of the European Council, which is also related to stronger media
5 The Foreign Affairs Council was previously part of the General Affairs Council and used to
address internal matters as well. However, international issues were always dominant.
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exposure. Therefore, an external focusing event discussed at the FAC level
will also be referred to by the Heads of State and Government at their next
summit if they regard the matter as substantially important for the Union
and want to stress the adopted position. For example, the FAC issued
conclusions on the conﬂict in Mali at its meeting on October 15, 2012,
which the European Council endorsed at its summit several days later
while additionally emphasising the key points of the EU stance.
Another reason for the more impervious “membrane” of the European
Council agenda in comparison with the FAC is the nature of information
processing in each of the two bodies. Although the Council conﬁguration is
focused on a single policy domain, the institution brings together the Heads
of State and Government to discuss a much broader set of issues. Even if
international affairs take up a large portion of the agenda (Wessels 2008;
Alexandrova et al. 2012), other urgent topics cannot be ignored.Moreover,
the FAC is supposed to meet once every month and in fact convenes even
more often (Gomez and Peterson 2001), whereas European Council
summits are rarer. Speciﬁcally, European Council summits took place
approximately two to three times a year until the mid-1990s and four to
seven times a year ever since, with many informal and extraordinary
meetings accounting for this increase. An example illustrating that events
have weaker access to the European Council agenda is the Haiti earthquake
of January 2010, mentioned in the introduction, which killed over 200,000
and affected some 3.7 million people. The FAC organised an extraordinary
meeting following the event to express EU solidarity and signal a
commitment to provide assistance. The European Council did not
discuss the matter at its next meeting, which was an informal summit
dedicated exclusively to the Greek debt crisis. Thus, the highest political
authority probably did not recognise the issue as salient enough to call an
extraordinary summit or add the point to the next meeting. It was,
furthermore, preoccupied with another domestic crisis that had just
erupted in the end of 2009.
In short, the European Council is a core venue for discussing EU foreign
affairs including external focusing events. It is, furthermore, the institution
where the most salient events are placed on the EU agenda, which makes it
the most appropriate body for studying the prioritisation of such crises.
The logic of reaction to external focusing events
Potential focusing events happening abroad often make it to domestic agen-
das for a variety of reasons. The logic of reacting to external events can be
similar to the one employed in domestic cases, as a disaster occurring even at a
large distance can add salience to issues that are part of national policy.
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Making analogies is often unavoidable. An example of this is the Fukushima
nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, which became popular news internationally
as it raised the issue of nuclear security to the top of the agenda in different
countries and the EU (see e.g. Chien 2013). External focusing events
can also trigger attention because of the consequences that the event
might incur on the relationship between the location of occurrence and
the reacting polity. For example, the eruption of the conﬂict in Mali in 2012
triggered EU attention, as the event was identiﬁed as a serious security
threat (Cristiani and Fabiani 2013). An event might also be an opportunity
for pursuing speciﬁc actions that contribute to broad policy goals. The EU
sanctions against Syria after the start of the conﬂict there in 2011 with
the core aim of promoting democracy constitute an example of this
(Seeberg 2015). These different considerations are not exclusive, and as the
interpretation of focusing events is a complex process the reasons for reacting
could be multiple.
The logic behind making a decision to address an external focusing event
can be understood through aspects that are both exogenous and endogen-
ous to the reacting policy venue. The ﬁrst category includes the nature of the
event and the consequences it brings about. The second category covers
factors emanating from the relationship between the foreign country where
an event occurred and the domestic polity. Furthermore, structural capacity
aspects pertaining to the competition between events and the capacity of the
domestic venue’s agenda to incorporate new issues have to be considered.
The distinction between endogenous and exogenous aspects resembles
the two core notions underlying the debate on foreign aid motivations –
recipient’s need versus donor’s interest (Kato 1969; Kaplan 1975;
Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; McKinlay and Little 1977, 1978, 1979;
McKinlay, 1979). Applying these terms in the present study might be
misleading, as they imply a hierarchical relationship between rich powers
and poor developing countries that materialises in the form of resource
transfer. In the reaction to potential focusing events abroad, such a
relationship need not exist. Nevertheless, the literature on foreign aid and
disaster assistance constitutes a rich source of relevant determinants of
reaction, which can be borrowed and adapted accordingly for the purpose
of explaining attention allocation.
Exogenous factors comprise event type and magnitude. Potential
focusing events can be classiﬁed into two groups – natural and manmade
disasters (Birkland 1997, 1998, 2006). Faulkner (2001) elaborates on the
meaning of this distinction, discriminating between events induced by the
actions or inactions of organisations versus those induced by natural
phenomena or external human action. This distinction is similar to
Deborah Stone’s (1989, 2002) classiﬁcation of human actions as unguided
The clout of external focusing events in the European Council 511
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or purposeful in her analysis of causal stories.6 For example, the recent
tsunami in the Philippines in November 2013 can be regarded as a natural
disaster. A terrorist attack, like the Istanbul bombings in 2003, on the other
hand, represents a purposeful human action that envisaged reaching
particular effects.7 The basic typology of focusing events can have
consequences for political attention due to repercussions on policy.
Spending attention is a ﬁrst step in signalling that policymakers are
determined to prevent similar cases in the future, and prevention seems
more likely to succeed in manmade accidents (e.g. via civilian or military
missions). As Stone notes, “in the natural world the best we can do is to
mitigate effects” (Stone 1989, 284), whereas in the realm of purposeful
human action impediments for future actions can be designed. Moreover,
purposeful activities by individuals are often discussed with the goal of
allocating blame, which can later be used in sanctioning. In politics,
assigning blame is an instrument to justify actions (Tilly 2008) and as such
can be applied to back up existing policies or devise new ones. Therefore:
H1: Manmade incidents should have a higher chance of being discussed
than natural disasters in the context of the European Council.
Although by deﬁnition the magnitude of a focusing event is considered to be
high, the scope varies (Faulkner 2001). The extent of harm can be measured
by the number of casualties (dead and injured), damage to property and
infrastructure or total cost to the economy (see e.g. Alexander 1997;
Birkland 1997; Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005). Events with a high
number of casualties also have strong emotional appeal to the public, which
might additionally induce a reaction from political elites. Studies on media
coverage of various events (e.g. natural disasters or hazard events) have
found that the number of casualties and extent of damage has an effect on
the level of reporting (Freudenburg et al. 1996; Van Belle 2000). A similar
logic can be applied to political agendas. Although different types of events
might be more or less prone to incur damage to housing and infrastructure,
the value of human life is probably the most comparable indicator. It does
6 Stone draws a second line of distinction on the extent to which an event is amenable to
human intervention or its consequences are intended versus unintended (see also Gundel 2005 for
a similar distinction).
7 Even if it seems straightforward, the distinction between natural and manmade focusing
events is not undisputed, because, as Stone points out, different actors attempt to portray the
problem associated with the dramatic occurrence via different lenses. Although accounting for
such volatility in depiction is crucial when analysing the development of a single issue across
venues, considering a ﬁxed typology from the perspective of a single institutional venue does not
involve bias. Moreover, most sudden events with large-scale negative effects are framed pre-
dominantly as belonging to a single type.
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not encompass all potential focusing events but relates to a broad range of
cases, such as incidents in conﬂicts, terrorist attacks and most types of
natural disasters. Therefore, we could expect that:
H2: The higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a potential
focusing event, the higher the likelihood that the event will be featured on
the agenda and gain more attention.
Endogenous factors that could inﬂuence attention to potential focusing
events reﬂect a certain relationship between the venue addressing the
occurrence or its political system broadly and the country/region in which
the event takes place. In particular, the decision to pay attention to an event
could depend on strategic interests of a geopolitical, security or economic
nature (Kato 1969; Kaplan 1975; Dudley and Montmarquette 1976;
McKinlay and Little 1977, 1978, 1979;Meernik et al. 1998; Van Belle et al.
2004; Nelson 2012). Although this category includes a large range of
theoretically relevant determinants, the logic behind their effect is generally
the same. By giving attention to an external event, a polity seeks to render
indirect beneﬁts for itself – protect its own citizens, increase its external
political inﬂuence, further its own economic gains or safeguard its
domestic security.
In terms of geopolitics, it seems plausible to expect that catastrophes in
immediate or close proximity have an easier time reaching the agenda of the
European Council, as the repercussions of such crises can be easily felt.
For example, the EU should care more about the wars in former
Yugoslavia than any civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa due to the proximity
of the threat and the consequences of the conﬂict, such as refugee ﬂows.
Thus, we could expect that:
H3: Potential focusing events occurring in geographically closer countries
should be more likely to catch the attention of the European Council.
Geopolitical goals can also relate to ideological positions – notably, the
promotion of democracy and democratic values. According to rational
thinking, democratic states often support the protection of human rights
and civil liberties around the world, because this will deliver long-term
stability and peace, which in turn reduces security risks and enhances the
opportunities of political and economic gains through cooperation. The
question of whether more democratic countries tend to receive higher
portions of foreign aid has yielded mixed results in the literature. For
example, althoughMeernik et al. (1998) ﬁnd evidence for such an effect for
US assistance allocations, McKinlay and Little (1979) do not. Yet, the EU
has identiﬁed the protection and consolidation of democracy, the rule of
law and human rights as core values of its development policy.
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These elements are also part of the political criteria for EU membership.
This suggests that:
H4: The European Council should be more receptive to focusing events
occurring in more democratic countries.
Another materialisation of the rational consideration is the economic side
of the relationship. Trade between nations is a key variable in international
cooperation. In a recent study conducting a pooled analysis of 22 states
(Nelson 2012), larger trade exchanges between countries have been found
to underline the decision to grant foreign aid, but individual country
examinations provide a more nuanced picture (see e.g. McKinlay 1979).
For the EU with its highly developed Common Commercial Policy, such
logic might be particularly important. Trade ﬂows between the EU and a
state in which a disaster, large-scale accident or conﬂict happens can be
disrupted or at least strained due to the occurrence. For this reason, the EU
should be particularly alert to crises in countries with which it trades most.
Therefore, we could expect that:
H5: The higher the trade volume between a country and the EU, the
stronger the impact a potential focusing event in that country would have
on the European Council agenda.
Strategic interests can also be represented by the desire to maintain security
in a country where an unexpected crisis disturbs the daily life of citizens.
Although a focusing event anywhere abroad could constitute an indirect
security threat, states may be more likely to show an interest in their
security partners (see e.g. Meernik et al. 1998). The core reason for this is
that military allies will be the ones to turn to in the event of major domestic
security problems. For the EU, which does not have a defence personality
equal to that of nation states, the natural security partners are the
co-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Article 4
of the Treaty poses that the parties shall consult with one another when one
of them considers its territorial integrity, political independence or security
threatened. This means that a focusing event posing a threat to one of the
NATO members should evoke attention in all the others. Therefore, we
could expect that:
H6: The European Council should be more likely to discuss an external
focusing event occurring in non-EU NATO member states.
Besides the exogenous and endogenous factors, structural capacity aspects
have to be taken into account. As agenda-setting theories pose, issues
compete for attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and
Baumgartner 2005), and potential focusing events represent issues with the
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capability to disturb the prescheduled agenda. However, the possibility of
addressing a speciﬁc crisis might be expected to depend on the number of
last-minute intruding elements and the free space for additional agenda
points. Therefore, when evaluating the likelihood for an event to appear on
the agenda, we need to account for the total number of potential
focusing events, thus controlling for the competition between these
occurrences. The expectation is that:
H7: The higher the number of potential focusing events at a given point in
time, the lower the success rate in agenda access.
We also need to control for the overall number of potential focusing events
in individual countries. The more regularly crises occur in a given state, the
less likely policymakers might be to allocate attention, as the level of event
unexpectedness and rarity might seem lower. Therefore:
H8: The more prone a country is to experience potential focusing events,
the lower the chance for events occurring in it to feature on the European
Council agenda.
When analysing the share of attention that focusing events receive, the
diversity of the agenda needs to be considered. A generally broader range of
topics for deliberation suggests lower costs in switching between them. This
implies that a more diverse agenda (i.e. containing more items of similar size)
is likely to provide more leeway for attention to an additional item compared
with an agenda with only a few discussion points of unequal size. Therefore:
H9: The more diverse the European Council agenda, the more attention
focusing events should receive.
To sum up, the factors that could theoretically inﬂuence the decision to give
attention to a particular potential focusing event and the level of this
attention can be classiﬁed as exogenous and endogenous. The ﬁrst category
encompasses event-speciﬁc elements such as type and magnitude. The
second category involves factors characterising the relationship between
the EU and the country of the event occurrence. EU strategic interests
might comprise geopolitical, economic and security considerations. In
addition, structural capacity aspects such as a reduced possibility to
incorporate new issues in the agenda and competition between potential
focusing events might act as attention constraints.
Data and approach
No uniﬁed collection of focusing events exists, but various documented
records of speciﬁc types of crises have been compiled. Combining elements
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of these allows the creation of a pool approximating a database of possible
focusing events on a global scale. This study combined three such collec-
tions. The International Emergency Disaster Database was used to record
natural disasters and industrial accidents. For measuring the eruptions of
violent conﬂicts, the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Programme/Peace Research
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conﬂict Dataset was utilised.8 The
RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents provided a list of
terrorist attacks. All three data sources contain information on the
number of people killed in a potential focusing event and the geographical
location of the crisis, and overall cover the period between 1975 and 2012.
Exceptions to this include the terrorism data, which ends in 2010, and
the records on the number of people killed in violent conﬂicts, which
commence in 1989.
These databases were not developed to trace potential focusing events
outside the EU but rather any historical events within a particular domain
all over the world. As such, the amount of entries was in some cases quite
large, and not all events were relevant for this study. In particular, many
incidents were not of a large scale, which is one of the characteristics of a
potential focusing event. Therefore, besides excluding cases internal to the
EU, the extraction of data from two of the sources was based on
scale-related conditions. Disasters were considered when either the number
of killed equalled at least 1,000 or the number of affected people
corresponded to at least 10,000, yielding 3,615 cases. Terrorist attacks
were included in the ﬁnal sample when the causalities in terms of either
injured or killed humans had reached 100, resulting in 184 events. The
armed conﬂicts database was used in full, presenting 926 cases.9 The
total number of potential focusing events in the ﬁnal database is 4,725.
In order to identify the presence of focusing events on the European
Council agenda and the attention given to them, a new dataset
of the Conclusions issued by this institution after its regular meetings
was utilised.10 Developed within the EU Policy Agendas Project
(Alexandrova et al. 2014), it covers the period 1975–2012 and includes the
full text of all Conclusions coded for policy content.11 The dataset was
extended for the purposes of this article to signify the sections dedicated to
or based on the occurrence of focusing events.12 This allowed the creation
8 Available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conﬂict_dataset/.
9 One entry overlapping with the RDWTI data was excluded.
10 Available at http://www.policyagendas.eu/data.html.
11 The European Council began regular meetings in 1975.
12 A section is not always fully dedicated to a focusing event but often starts with the occur-
rence and moves further to other issues brought forward by it.
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of a pool of all focusing events referred to by the European Council, as well
as the detection of the extent of attention each of them received as a share of
the whole agenda for a particular meeting.
It should be noted that not all items classiﬁed in the European Council
Conclusions could be found in the constructed potential focusing events
database. For example, the Tanker Amoco Cadiz crash (1978) and the
Prestige wreck (2002) that caused large oil spills were not present in the
disasters dataset. Another example can be seen in international economic
disruptions, such as the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 or the oil crises of the 1970s.
Although these unintended exclusions limited the pool of focusing events
discussed in the European Council, the reduction in data was systematic
and should not have affected the ﬁnal results. Moreover, most of the
excluded events were of such types that they did not correspond to the
overall measurements of effects. The oil spills, for instance, did not have
human casualties but environmental impacts, and the two are clearly not
directly comparable.
A few additional sources were consulted in order to identify the EU
relationship with countries around the world. Neighbouring countries were
considered to consist of all current EU member states before the date of
their accession, the countries within the present European Neighbourhood
Policy, EFTA members and the candidates or potential candidates for EU
membership (states in the Western Balkans and Turkey). NATO member-
ship was also coded as a dummy variable with due regard to the year of
accession. The total volume of external trade between the EU and third
countries was recorded on an annual basis from Eurostat (available since
1988).13 Democracy status was taken from the Freedom House annual
index, and was represented by a score of 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest level of
freedom) for political rights and civil liberties (averaged).14 The variables
democracy status and trade exchange were matched with the events with a
one-year lag. The two variables on the number of potential focusing events
per year and per location were calculated on the basis of the existing data.
Agenda diversity was estimated via Shannon’s H index, also measured on
an annual basis.
It should be noted that the entries in the database corresponded to single
events in the case of terrorist attacks and disasters but constituted annual
entries for conﬂicts. Therefore, attention was aggregated in the latter case to
reﬂect yearly discussions. Although this might seem to suggest a lack of
13 Derived from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/international_trade/data/
database.
14 Derived from http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Country%20Ratings%20and
%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28FINAL%29.xls.
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Table 1. Summary of variables, sources and descriptive statistics
All Potential Focusing Events Subset Events on the Agenda
Variable Source Observation
Mean/
Proportion SD Minimum Maximum Observation
Mean/
Proportion SD Minimum Maximum
Potential focusing
event (D)
EM-DAT,
UCDP/PRIO
ACD &
RDWTI
4,725 0.021 0.142 0 1
Disasters only
(D)
EM-DAT 3,615 0.005 0.068 0 1
Violent acts
only (D)
UCDP/PRIO
ACD &
RDWTI
1,110 0.072 0.259 0 1
Attention to a
focusing event
European
Council
Conclusions,
EUPAP
97 0.052 0.111 0.002 1
Number of killed
people (per
1,000)
EM-DAT,
UCDP/PRIO
ACD &
RDWTI
3,837 1.069 13.506 0 610 96 9.574 39.061 0.008 300
Neighbouring
country (D)
European
Commission
4,725 0.084 0.277 0 1 97 0.443 0.499 0 1
Democracy status
(t −1)
Freedom House 4,703 4.322 1.775 1 7 97 4.67 1.997 1 7
External trade
volume (t − 1,
in million
EUR)
Eurostat 3,932 28.144 66.817 0.001 430.058 92 14.198 39.28 0.013 250.016
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Table 1. Continued
All Potential Focusing Events Subset Events on the Agenda
Variable Source Observation
Mean/
Proportion SD Minimum Maximum Observation
Mean/
Proportion SD Minimum Maximum
NATO
membership
(D)
NATO 4,725 0.036 0.186 0 1 97 0.041 0.2 0 1
Agenda diversity
(Shannon’s H
index)
Own
calculation
4,725 2.33 0.23 1.667 2.688 97 2.336 0.186 2.022 2.688
Number of
potential
focusing
events/year
Own
calculation
4,725 161.476 38.821 49 237 97 156.454 32.242 110 237
Number of
potential
focusing
events/country
Own
calculation
4,725 126.926 133.532 0 395 97 52.402 65.216 1 375
Note: D indicates a dummy variable. Neighbouring countries include all current EU member states before the date of their accession, the
countries within the present European Neighbourhood Policy, EFTA members and the candidates or potential candidates for EU
membership (states in the Western Balkans and Turkey).
EM-DAT = International Emergency Disaster Database; UCDP/PRIO ACD = Uppsala Conﬂict Data Programme/Peace Research
Institute Oslo Armed Conﬂict Dataset; RDWTI = RANDDatabase onWorldwide Terrorism Incidents; EUPAP = European Union Policy
Agendas Project.
T
he
clout
of
externalfocusing
events
in
the
E
uropean
C
ouncil
519
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X15000197
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek, on 14 Nov 2017 at 13:44:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
systematicity, in did not in fact pose a real problem, as yearly violent
conﬂicts represented a sum of a range of incidents. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for all variables. It does so for the complete dataset of
all potential focusing events and the subset of it containing only the pool
of focusing events discussed by the European Council.
The analysis of the determinants behind the agenda-setting impact of
potential focusing events was carried out in a two-step approach. First, the
hypotheses were tested on the full version of the dataset in order to answer
the question as to what causes the appearance of focusing events on
the European Council agenda. The dependent variable here was
dichotomous, indicating whether each of the 4,725 cases was discussed or
not. Therefore, a logistic regression was used.15 The second step addressed
the question of what determines the level of attention a focusing event
receives. Here, the dependent variable corresponded to the segment of
attention each crisis had been allocated as a share of the total agenda of the
respective meeting. Thus, it constituted a subset of only 97 focusing events
featured in the full dataset that the European Council effectively discussed.
In this case, a fractional logit model was applied, as it is the most suitable
method for fractional dependent variables (Papke and Wooldridge 1996).
The two-step approach adopted here is similar to some studies of foreign
aid allocation (e.g. McGillivray and Oczkowski 1991, 1992). The decision
to spend aid and the actual disbursement of funds are two processes that
might – but need not necessarily – depend on each other. In the same line of
thinking, the agreement to discuss a potential focusing event in the
European Council is separate from the decision on the actual amount of
attention the event will receive. Yet, as this theoretical proposition required
an empirical validation, a Heckman selection model was run on the data
(not shown). This method controlled for the potential bias introduced in the
second step of the analysis from the selection of particular events in the ﬁrst
stage. The correlation between the error of the regression equation and the
error of the selection equation of the Heckman model – ρ – was not
signiﬁcant, indicating that selection bias was not a signiﬁcant concern.
Therefore, the two-step approach described above was adopted.
Attention to focusing events in the European Council
The total number of unique focusing events identiﬁed in the European
Council Conclusions was 114, with 102 of them being external. In over half
15 Another option is to use a probit model, which would be equally suitable for the data. As
the goodness of ﬁt statistics are quite similar for the ﬁtted models of the two regression types and
as the results of a logit model are easier to interpret, the latter was chosen.
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of all summits, a crisis of some kind triggered attention. Figure 1 displays the
frequency of all external focusing events per meeting. More often, a single
event was mentioned, but in a substantive amount of cases the number went
up to two or three. Some crises were addressedmore than once in consecutive
meetings because of the prominence of the issue, its evolving nature (e.g.
escalation of a conﬂict) or both. This brought the total number of external
events (unique and repeated ones) discussed in all meetings up to 239.
Nine per cent of all text in the European Council Conclusions was
associated with an external focusing event (and an additional 1% with
domestic cases).16 Three-fourths of the unique crises were manmade inci-
dents, featuring eruptions of violent conﬂicts and wars, terrorist attacks and
a few speciﬁc cases of events like invasions, assassinations, nuclear tests and
so on. Floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and famine were among the most
common kinds of natural disasters. In six extraordinary and/or informal
summits, the whole agenda of the European Council consisted of issues
stemming directly from a focusing event. They comprise the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the Iraq disarmament crisis, the start of the Russia–Georgia war,
the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Second Intifada in the Palestinian–
Israeli conﬂict and the Fall of the Berlin Wall.
The total number of focusing events incorporated in the ﬁnal dataset is 97
(see Table 1), and differs from the frequency of focusing events addressed in the
Conclusions, 102 unique cases, or 239 in total including repeated ones. Besides
the aforementioned exclusion of some events (like oil spills), this discrepancy is
due to two reasons. First, in the ﬁnal dataset, some crises that were mentioned
as a single case by the European Council were included as multiple entries
because the Conclusions mentioned a region rather than a country, whereas
Figure 1 Frequency of unique external focusing events addressed at European
Council meetings, 1975–2012.
16 This attention is divided approximately in half between unique and repeated cases.
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the events datasets were organised around individual countries. Examples
include hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 and the famine in the
Sahel region in 1983. Second, some conﬂict-related events that were repeatedly
discussed in the EuropeanCouncil were reduced to a single annual entry due to
the structure of the conﬂict data. Examples include the Second Intifada in the
Palestinian–Israeli conﬂict, whichwas discussed at three meetings in 2002, and
the Syrian Civil War present on the agenda of four summits in 2012.
Analysing the agenda-upsetting effect
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression on the full dataset
(model 1).17 It appears that both exogenous factors play a role in determining
the choice to address a potential focusing event in the European Council.
Signiﬁcant effects are found for event type and the number of people killed.
The odds of presence on the agenda are 0.10%higher for manmade incidents
than for natural disasters, all other variables held constant. This highly
signiﬁcant effect of focusing event type requires further consideration,
wherefore separate analyses are carried out on subsets of the data containing
disasters (model 1A) and violent acts – that is, conﬂicts and terrorist attacks
(model 1B). The effect of the death toll is consistent across the two event
types. Thus, with a 1,000 more people killed in an event, the odds of it
appearing on the agenda increase by 0.85% for natural disasters, all other
variables held constant (model 1A). For manmade disasters, the increase is
4.15% (model 1B). Running model 1 with an interaction term for event type
and the size of the death toll, and plotting themarginal effects (not shown) for
the dichotomous variable, reveals a more nuanced story. Differences are
signiﬁcant only when the number of killed people ranges between about
150,000 and 510,000. For smaller and higher values, the difference is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, conﬂicts and terrorist attacks are more likely to
attract attention than natural disasters when the death toll is neither too small
nor extremely large, but rather in a medium range.
Among the exogenous variables, the only one with a signiﬁcant effect is
neighbourhood. Interestingly, the neighbourhood effect seems to be relevant
for manmade catastrophes, as natural disasters in the EU neighbourhood did
not make it to the agenda in the period 1988–2012. Note that the neigh-
bourhood dummy is not included inmodel 1A, as it predicts failure perfectly.18
The exclusion of the NATO membership variable is equivalent. Model 1B
17 No problems with multicollinearity were found.
18 No disasters in the neighbourhood gained attention besides the Chernobyl nuclear reactor
explosion, but this case is excluded from the model as there is missing data on the variable
external trade.
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Table 2. Logistic regression: predicting presence of focusing events on the agenda, 1988–2012
Model 1 Model 1A Model 1B
All Events Natural Disasters Humanly Caused Disasters
Event type (D) −2.268 (0.303)***
Number of killed people (per 1,000) 0.00863 (0.00454)* 0.00848 (0.00410)** 0.0415 (0.0209)**
Neighbouring country (D) 1.403 (0.295)*** 1.994 (0.354)***
Democracy status (t −1) −0.0532 (0.0804) −0.161 (0.187) 0.0184 (0.0965)
External trade volume (t−1, in million EUR) −0.000340 (0.00459) −0.00704 (0.0147) −0.00574 (0.00664)
NATO membership (D) −0.817 (0.511) −0.645 (0.532)
Number of potential focusing events (FEs)/
year
−0.0117 (0.00470)**
Number of potential FEs/year (disasters only) −0.0103 (0.0116)
Number of potential FEs/year (violent acts
only)
0.00604 (0.0183)
Number of potential FEs/country −0.00761 (0.00280)***
Number of potential FEs/country (disasters
only)
−0.00974 (0.00428)**
Number of potential FEs/country (violent acts
only)
−0.0117 (0.00624)*
Constant −0.177 (0.911) −2.470 (1.824) −3.023 (1.067)***
Observations 3,254 2,178 1,076
Log pseudo-likelihood −314.401 −72.833 −243.123
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.08 0.13
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; D indicates a dummy variable.
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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shows that, for manmade disasters, the odds of appearing on the agenda are
6.35% higher in neighbouring countries than in the rest of the world, all other
variables held constant. The other strategic interest variables – democracy
status, trade volume and NATO membership – do not play a role in the
decision for which events to discuss at the summits.
Both structural capacity measures work in the expected direction in the
pooled model. The higher the number of potential focusing events
occurring in a given year, the less likely the European Council is to select
events. The same logic applies to the overall country level. The more often
potential focusing events occur in a particular state, the lower the like-
lihood that events from that country will feature on the agenda. These
two relationships show that events compete for attention across both
time and space.
Model 2 (Table 3) presents the second step in the analysis – fractional
logits on the subset of the data featuring only the focusing events discussed
in the European Council. As the coefﬁcients in a fractional logit are not very
informative, marginal effects are presented. Unlike in the models predicting
the presence of events on the agenda, exogenous factors such as the
magnitude and event type do not play a signiﬁcant role here. The decision
on how much attention to dedicate is motivated purely by endogenous
explanations of self-interest, particularly geographical proximity and a
higher level of trade. Focusing events occurring in neighbouring countries
are associated with an increase in attention of 0.05 percentage points
Table 3. Fractional logit (marginal effects): predicting attention levels to
focusing events present on the agenda, 1988–2012
Model 2
All events
Event type (D) −0.01249(0.0136)
Number of killed people (per 1,000) 0.00024(0.00019)
Neighbouring country (D) 0.03013(0.01272)**
Democracy status (t–1) −0.00713(0.00598)
External trade volume (t–1, in million EUR) 0.00036(0.0002)*
NATO membership (D) −0.02698(0.00867)
Agenda diversity 0.06443(0.05772)
Observations 91
Log pseudo-likelihood −13.074
Deviance 6.817
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; D indicates a dummy variable.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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compared with those in countries from the rest of the world, measured at
the predicted European Council attention mean of 3.43%. Stronger
trade interchange between the EU and a third country leads to more
attention to focusing events in that state once these events are already
on the agenda. However, the size of this effect is rather small. A one-unit
(i.e. 1 million EUR) increase in the trade volume results in a 0.00036
percentage-point increase in attention at the predicted attention mean of
3.43%. The other two endogenous variables – democratic status and
NATO membership – do not have signiﬁcant effects. The same holds for
the level of agenda diversity.
Discussion and conclusions
Focusing events play an important role in the policy cycle, given their power
to reshufﬂe agendas. However, the number of events that could potentially
classify as “focusing” in a given time frame is, in fact, tremendous, and
organisations tend to process information disproportionately. Therefore,
giving attention to certain policy venues is not a matter of automatic
reaction, but rather involves the element of political choice. Allocating
attention to events beyond the borders of one’s territory might be under-
scored by exogenous and endogenous factors, as well as affected by
structural capacity constraints of the agenda. Starting an enquiry into this
decision-making logic with the case study of the EU is a tough test for
disentangling stable logics of impact, as the EU is a polity in the making
with sometimes an ambiguous personality in the international arena.
A focus on the European Council is justiﬁed, as it presents a venue of high
political authority with the capacity for immediate reaction to matters of
foreign affairs.
Combining data from multiple sources, this study presents the ﬁrst
systematic analysis of the determinants of attention to external focusing
events over a period longer than two decades. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the
decisions regarding the selection of priority events and the allocation of
attention are independent of one another and guided by different concerns.
Determinants used to choose which potential focusing events appear on the
agenda include a mix of exogenous and endogenous factors, highlighting
the cohabitation of humanitarian considerations and strategic interests in
an environment of competition among events. In particular, events are
more powerful agenda-setting factors when they classify as manmade. They
also become more powerful with a rise in the number of people killed with
one caveat: manmade disasters have an easier time attracting attention in
the European Council than natural disasters when the death toll is neither
too small nor extremely high. Of the endogenous self-interest variables,
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only neighbourhood appears to have an effect. However, although for
violent acts proximity to EU borders increases the likelihood of agenda
presence, the location of the event does not play a role for natural disasters.
Competition between crises is a constraint for appearance on the agenda
both across time and geographical location.
The attention that focusing events receive once they have made it onto
the agenda depends upon endogenous factors, indicating a logic
grounded exclusively in EU self-interest. Two particular types of strategic EU
interests demonstrate signiﬁcant effects – location and trade volume. The
closer a country is to the EU geographically, the more likely it is
that events occurring within its territory not only elicit some response from
the European Council but also receive a higher portion of its attention
eventually. Besides, stronger trade exchange with a given state enhances
the likelihood of an event occurring in it to receive more attention, but
the effect is rather small. This suggests that a distinguishable increase
in attention can be seen only for a range of extremely big economic partners.
These ﬁndings offer insight into the EU’s role in international relations.
The fact that the Union is responsive to focusing events and that these
events are considered regularly at the top political level demonstrates a
desire for the EU to behave as a global power in world affairs. Yet, its
predominant orientation towards the neighbourhood when it comes to
addressing violent acts might appear to suggest a regional power perspec-
tive. However, this can also be seen as a deliberate choice, for only if the
EU is able to “reinforce dynamics of stability and prosperity in its
broader regional context”, will it also reinforce its “global standing”
(Maurer and Simão 2013, 106).
The neighbourhood predisposition in reacting to violent acts can be
interpreted as strategically motivated for two reasons. The aspiration to
be seen as a global power in the long run is intertwined with the importance
of prevention. Manmade disasters pose multiple direct threats such as a
transfer of conﬂict to EU territory or an increased possibility of terrorist
attacks or refugee ﬂows. However, they also have global implications in the
context of contemporary security challenges due to the high level of
interconnectedness in the world. Thus, reacting to external violent acts
presents opportunities for the EU both to protect its own territory and
citizens from immediate negative consequences and to position itself in
international affairs.
The generally soft image of Europe in world politics is reconﬁrmed by the
importance of the level of causalities in disasters as a key factor in deter-
mining whether to discuss events, no matter if they are natural or
manmade. This is satisfactory from a normative point of view, but also has
its limits. Notably, there is a sort of disaster fatigue associated with the
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country of origin, as the regular occurrence of potential focusing events in a
given state limits the chance for attention to be given by the EU leaders to
particular cases from that state. Although this conﬁrms the presence of a
bounded rationality constraint, it also hints at a sort of balancing in the
selection across the globe because of the EU’s desire for international
visibility.
The ﬁndings here add to the literature on the politics of attention. The
signiﬁcant effects of bounded rationality constraints in the agenda presence
models provide evidence for a major claim in agenda-setting theories –
scarcity of attention. The more information signals ﬂoat in the
environment, the lower the chance for each of them to gain access to the
political agenda. This chance is also lower when more information signals
keep coming from the same external location. Thus, in the foreign affairs part
of the agenda, issue competition takes place both across time and space. There
is a limit to the permeability of the agenda “membrane”, and more intruding
information onlymakes selection harderwithout offering new possibilities for
access. Interestingly, however, bounded rationality has an effect only on the
issue selection phase and not on the ﬁnal allocation of attention.
This study has laid the basis for theorising on the logic of responsiveness
to focusing events in the EU and beyond. The distinction between potential
and effective focusing events proves to be an important one, as the
transformation of the ﬁrst into the second is not automatic but rather is
underscored by speciﬁc considerations. The literature on foreign aid and
disaster assistance provides valuable insights for theory building. However,
the selection of the venue for responsiveness is crucial for the kind of
expectations one can suggest on attention dynamics. Further research
should test the “successful ingredients” for the agenda-setting impact of
potential and effective focusing events on other political systems. It should
also concentrate on developing a more ﬁne-grained measure of magnitude
that can incorporate types of events excluded in this article, such as oil
spills. With the creation of new event datasets, it might become possible to
further differentiate the dichotomous events typology applied here, which
may yield useful evidence for the policymaking responses beyond the
agenda-setting stage.
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